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Abstract—Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the in-
vehicle network protocols that is used to communicate among
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and has been de-facto standard.
CAN is simple and has several vulnerabilities such as unable
to distinguish spoofing messages because it doesn’t support any
authentication or sender identification properties. In previous
work, some voltage-based methods to identify the sender node
have been proposed. The methods can identify ECUs with high
accuracy. However, the accuracy of source identification depends
on a feature that is extracted from a continuous function of
voltage use sampling. In general, as the sampling rate increases,
the accuracy of identification is improved. Though the amount of
data used for the identification increases too. Hence, it is desired
to create an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that identifies
ECUs using few sampling features as there is a limited computing
resource in vehicles. In this paper, we propose a delay-time
based sender identification method of ECUs. We confirm that
the proposed method achieved a true positive rate of 96.7% in
CAN bus prototype against spoofing attack from a compromised
ECU, detecting spoofing attack from an unmonitored ECU with
a true positive rate of 98.0% in real-vehicle.
Index Terms—Automotive Security, Controller Area Network,
Physical-Layer Identification, Intrusion Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increase in the number of automobiles that con-
nect to the internet, cyberattacks on automobiles are becoming
a severe problem [1], [2]. These attacks abuse vulnerable
Controller Area Network (CAN) [3] which is one of the
in-vehicle network protocols that is used to communicate
among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and has been de-facto
standard. Nie et al. successfully controlled some automotive
functions, exploiting the vulnerabilities in a CAN and a
browser in the in-vehicle system implemented by WebKit of
the old version [1]. Therefore, cybersecurity countermeasures
for automobiles are urgently required.
Countermeasures such as encryption and authentication
have been proposed to prevent spoofing, sniffing and replay
attacks. Since CAN has only a short data field of 8 bytes
and limited bandwidth, adding a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) is not practical. Moreover, since some authentication
methods [4], [5] require pre-shared keys and does not con-
cern itself with key exchanges. Therefore, these methods are
impractical in automobiles that are already widespread.
While the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has a good
advantage in terms of effectiveness and high compatibility in
automotive security different from encryption and authentica-
tion. One such case is, IDSs based on characteristics of digital-
level (e.g. frequency, entropy, ID sequence). The approach can
be adapted easily to the CAN bus of modern automobiles.
However, these approaches typically have higher false posi-
tives for some attack types. For instance, ID sequence-based
IDS [6] cannot detect replay attacks, in which an adversary
sends messages of the same ID sequence. Hence, we should
consider an IDS that can detect various attack types.
An IDS based on physical-level features such as the voltage
has been proposed. The methods based on voltage use result of
sampling continuous function as features. Thus, the accuracy
of identification depends on the sampling rate. In general,
as the sampling rate increases, the accuracy of identification
is improved [7]. However, the amount of data used for the
identification increases too. Hence, it is desired to create
an IDS that identifies ECUs using few sampling features in
vehicles limited computing resources. Therefore, we focus on
identifiable characteristics with few sampling. In this research,
we propose a delay-time based sender identification method.
The proposed method can identify the ECUs with a sampling
count less than the voltage based because the delay-time is
observed only from each rising edge of the CAN message.
The main contributions of this study can be summarized as
follows:
1) We propose delay-time based sender identification
method called Divider. Our method uses new character-
istics in the identification of ECUs. Divider does not use
continuous characteristics such as voltage, but the delay-
time to be observed in each rising edge of the CAN
message. Hence, Divider can identify the ECUs with
a sampling count less than the voltage based method.
Besides, the delay-time can be observed at only one
probe point.
2) Divider achieved a true positive rate of 96.7 % in CAN
bus prototype against spoofing attack from a compro-
mised ECU and a true positive rate of 98.0 % in real-
vehicle against spoofing attack from an unmonitored
ECU.
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(a) An example of CAN signal.
(b) CAN data frame format.
Fig. 1: CAN data frame.
II. CONTROLLER AREA NETWORK
CAN is one of the in-vehicle network protocols that is
widely used to communicate among ECUs and has been
a de-facto standard. Typical CAN node consists of Micro
Controller Unit (MCU), CAN controller and CAN transceiver.
The CAN controller processes various frames according to
the CAN protocol. The CAN transceiver converts the logical
level (low and high) and the CAN bus level (dominant and
recessive) between the CAN bus and the CAN controller.
ISO 11898 gives the High-Speed CAN bus specification. The
specifications are given for the maximum baud rate of 1 Mbps
and a maximum bus length of 40 m with up to 30 nodes can be
connected. A twisted-pair cable is used to ensure robust noise
immunity on the CAN bus. The two wires are called CAN-L
and CAN-H respectively. If dominant (logical 0) is transmitted,
CAN-H is driven towards higher voltage (typically 3.5 V) and
CAN-L is driven towards lower voltage 1.5 V, but when the
recessive (logical 1) is transmitted, both CAN-H and CAN-L
become 2.5 V, as Fig. 1 (a). In Fig. 1 (a), recessive is inserted
in a fixed period due to a bit called stuff-bit which is inserted
in after succeeding 5 bit of same logic for synchronization.
Also, the CAN bus is terminated at both ends with 120 Ω
resistors to prevent signal reflections.
As Fig. 1 (b) shows, a CAN data frame does not contain
a field that indicate its sender. Hence, a receiver cannot
distinguish which ECU transmitted a CAN message. The CAN
is simple and has several vulnerabilities such as unable to
distinguish spoofing messages due to no authentication. An
adversary can change the speedometer reading, unlock the
door, turn on the light and so on by sending a malicious
message on the CAN bus.
III. RELATED WORKS
A. IDS based on characteristics of digital-level
In [8] frequency-based intrusion detection method has been
proposed. However, there are limitations to the kinds of attacks
this method can detect. For example, the frequency-based
IDS is not able to detect a message mimicking the original
message’s frequency. In the same catagory, an IDS based the
message ID sequence has also been proposed [6]. However,
an adversary may inject malicious messages under legitimate
message ID sequences such as replay attacks.
The entropy of arbitration ID in fixed interval-based IDSs
have been proposed [9]–[11]. In these methods, if an adversary
injects one fake message per fixed interval, these IDSs cannot
detect the attack because the entropy of the interval is almost
the same value as usual. To detect the attack, these IDSs must
make the fixed interval a small value. Then, the false positive
rate of these IDSs will increase due to enormous influence per
one message against the entropy.
The IDS on a CAN using deep learning has been proposed
[12], [13]. These methods cannot be realized on in-vehicle
computers in restricted resources.
Although digital level attack detection has been extensively
studied, IDS based on characteristics of the digital-level has
some limitations. It is necessary to consider more advanced
attack detection methods.
B. IDS based on characteristics of physical-level
Murvay et al. firstly proposed a method for sender identi-
fication using physical characteristics in CAN [14]. Choi et
al. proposed an improved version of Murvay’s method [15].
They embed a fixed bit string into the extended identifier field
of the CAN frame and sample the signal and identify ECUs
by using 17 different features. Hence, these methods cannot
be implemented on the normal CAN because they require the
extended frame format in CAN.
Cho et al. proposed a system for identifying an attacker by
using voltage difference among ECUs called Viden [16]. They
implemented the system on MCU of a lower sampling rate
(50 kS/s) than CAN bus bit rate. Therefore, Viden requires
2-3 messages to output a voltage instance and updates the
profiles. Thus the first forged message will be accepted.
Another approach called Clock-based IDS (CIDS) to iden-
tify the sender node has been proposed by Cho et al [17].
Although CIDS does not need special hardware, it does
not apply to non-periodic messages and results in lowering
identification accuracy on such messages.
Besides, since Viden and CIDS rely on multiple messages
to make detection and identification, these methods have
vulnerability against the Hill-climbing-style attack [18], in
which an attacker sends gradually malicious messages without
being either detected or identified. To be robust against the
Hill-climbing-style attack, IDS has to detect the attacks using
features acquired in one message [7], [15], [18].
Scission [7] improved a problem in the sender identification
method proposed by Choi et al [15], which the method could
not get significant characteristics such as the overshoot. As a
result, Scission achieves higher accuracy 99.85 % of identi-
fication than Viden and the method of Choi et al. However,
since Scission uses Fourier Transform to calculate the features
of the frequency domain, the time complexity of Scission
is Ω(n log n) which is higher than the time complexity of
SIMPLE [18]. Because SIMPLE only use mean of voltage as
feature of ECUs, time complexity is Θ(n). In addition, since
these sender identification methods use result of sampling
continuous function, the accuracy of identification depends on
the sampling rate. In general, as the sampling rate increases,
the accuracy of identification is improved. But the amount
of data used for the identification increase too. Hence, IDS
which is limited in computing resources on the in-vehicle
system needs to be able to identify ECUs with few sampling.
Therefore, we focus on the identification method using another
characteristics with few sampling.
IV. DELAY-TIME BASED SENDER IDENTIFICATION:
DIVIDER
In the following section, we introduce the Divider, the
proposed method, to identify sender ECUs in CAN bus. First,
we describe the adversarial models that Divider assumes. Next,
we introduce the proposed method. Finally, we describe the
implementation method of Divider.
A. Adversarial models
In our research, we have considered two types of adversarial
models. These models are based on an example considered
by some researchers [19] and the actual attack against Jeep
Cherokee [2].
1) Compromised ECU: The first model is an ECU exploited
by adversary through attack surfaces such as Wi-Fi or Blue-
tooth. Since the ECU has some connectivity interfaces such
as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, the adversary may exploit the attack
surfaces [19]. However, because the ECU communicates the
other ECUs using CAN, Divider can monitor its messages.
Hence, Divider can detect adversary’s illegal ID attack from
a compromised ECU.
2) Unmonitored ECU: The second model is based on the
hacking of Jeep Cherokee [2], and the adversary from OBD-II
port. In actual hacking of Jeep Cherokee, Miller and Valasek
exploited a passive or unmonitored ECU’s update mechanism
to inject their code. As a result, the ECU unmonitored by IDS
can attack CAN. Also, some researchers attach the OBD-II
port to analyze and log the messages on the CAN bus. Thus,
we have to detect this adversarial model too. In other words,
we must suppose the attack from an ECU of which Divider
does not learn features.
B. Framework of Divider
In this section, we introduce a framework of Divider.
Divider is mainly organized by three phases (data acquisition,
feature extraction, classification). In the first phase of data
acquisition, we collect the delay-time from each ECU. In other
words, the data acquisition phase converts analog information
to a digital value. Next, in the feature extraction phase,
Divider extracts some statistical characteristics from delay-
time which are collected in the previous phase. Finally, Divider
classifies the statistical characteristics of CAN message using a
classification algorithm. In the following sections, we explain
each phase in order.
𝑉""
𝑅$
Fig. 2: CAN transceiver equivalent.
C. Data acquisition
1) Definition of delay-time in CAN: In this section, we
introduce the definition of delay-time in the proposed method.
Fig. 2 shows output schematic of typical CAN transceiver [20].
The upper side output structure consists of a series diode (D1)
and an N-channel FET (Q1). The lower side output structure
consists of a series diode (D2) and a P-channel FET (Q2).
The upper side diode (D1) prevents reverse current flow to
Vdd while the voltage on the CAN-H pin rises above Vdd.
RL indicates the load resistor. RL equals 60 Ω as parallel
combined resistance of two terminated 120 Ω resistors on
High-Speed CAN bus. CAN-L and CAN-H are weakly biased
to 2.5 V during the recessive state. The delay-time of the signal
level transitions is generally determined by the switching time
of the transistor and the time during which the load capacitance
of the output is charged and discharged. Factors of the load
capacitance include three types of output capacitance at the
gate of the transistor, input capacitance of the gate and wiring
capacitance. The factors of these delay-times are different for
each CAN node. The main idea is to use this fact to identify
the sender ECU of CAN message.
We experimented to observe these delays in the actual
environment. The experimental environment and the delay-
time in the environment are shown in Fig. 3 (a). As shown in
Fig. 3 (a), we constructed the environment from two ECUs and
we observed Tx (Node 1) and Rx (Node 2) with a oscilloscope.
Fig. 3 (b) shows a delay between Node 1 (upper in Fig. 3
(b)) and Node 2 (lower in Fig. 3 (b)). Also, the maximum
sampling rate of the oscilloscope is 2.0 GS/s. Therefore, the
time resolution is 1012/(2.0× 109) = 500 ps. The fall delay-
time of Tx to Rx is 82.0 ns, and the reverse is 99.0 ns in the
example given in Fig. 3 (b). The difference between rise and
fall is 17 ns. Divider uses this difference between ECUs to
distinguish each node.
As in the environment shown in Fig. 3 (a), the probe cannot
be installed on the ECU’s Tx to be identified on a real vehicle.
Therefore, the method calculates the delay-time using only the
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Fig. 3: Measurement of delay-time.
Fig. 4: Delay model in CAN.
information that can be observed by the receiving node. Fig.
4 shows a timing chart of CAN bus signal and transceiver on
CAN bus. There is a delay-time until the differential voltage
(Vdiff ) is generated after the Tx pin of the CAN transceiver
of the sending node changes and the Rx pin of the CAN
transceiver of the receiving node changes. We specified the
bit time period which the sender node generates as t1, the
delay-time between Tx pin signal on sender CAN controller
falls and Rx pin signal on receiver CAN transceiver falls as t2,
the delay-time between Tx pin signal when sender rises and
Rx pin signal when receiver rises as t3, and the bit time period
receiver CAN transceiver observes as t4. t4 can be represented
as:
t4 = t1 + t3 − t2 (1)
At this point, the time actually measured at the receiver
node is only t4, and t1, t2, t3 are unknown. Therefore, we
consider the relationship between t1 and tbit. Every CAN
node has an independent clock source and communicates while
synchronizing every falling edge. Hence, we define error of
crystal oscillator as te. The relation with t1 is represented as:
t1 = tbit + te (2)
A crystal oscillator is used in high-speed CAN node to
satisfy the frequency tolerance requirement. A typical crystal
oscillator has a frequency tolerance of about ±30 ppm to
±100 ppm [21]. We define frequency tolerance as ftol [ppm]
and frequency deviation ∆fe and the error of crystal oscillator
te are represented as follows:
∆fe = fbit × ftol × 106 Hz (3)
te =
1
fbit +∆fe
− tbit (4)
For instance, if we assume when CAN bus baudrate is
set to 500 kbps and frequency deviation is larger, fbit =
500 kHz, ftol = +100 ppm. ∆fe and te are:
∆fe = (500× 103)× (100× 10−6) = 50 Hz (5)
te =
1
500× 103 + 50 −
1
500× 103 ≈ −1.9998× 10
−10 s
(6)
−1.9998× 10−10 s equals −0.199 98 ns and t3 − t2 is of the
order of ±80 ns. From this, te is sufficiently smaller than
t3 − t2. Hence, we consider t1 = tbit then t3 − t2 can be
approximated:
t3 − t2 ≈ t4 − tbit (7)
2) Measurement period of delay-time: As we showed in
Fig. 1, length of a CAN data frame is variable and it is set
in the DLC field. Therefore, even if the length of the CAN
frame is the shortest (DLC=0), it is necessary to reliably be
able to measure the section transmitted by the target node.
Then, considering CAN frame such as DLC=0, 35 bits of
signal of SOF (1 bit), the arbitration field (12 bits), the control
field (6 bits) and CRC filed (16 bits) are transmitted by the
ACK field. Here, if we include the CRC delimiter to the
measurement period, there is a possibility that the rising edge
of the ACK slot is measured. We subtract 1 bit from 35.
Hence, we set the measurement period from SOF to time that
passing 34 bits time (68 µs). Since the length of 1 frame never
be shorter than the CAN frame when DLC=0, this allows us
to reliably measure only the signal of the target node. Also,
during the measurement of delay-time, the time capture is
performed every rising edge of the Rx pin.
We describe how to obtain delay-time, tdelay from the
measured counter value. As the unit of timer counter value
is 20 ns, The elapsed time from SOF, telapsed (ns) can be
calculated as:
telapsed = (capture counter value−SOF counter value)×20
(8)
TABLE I: A list of statistical features considered in the
selection. x is the delay-time in one CAN message, N is the
number of measured delay-time in one CAN message.
Feature Description
Mean µ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
Standard Deviation σ =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1(x(i) − µ)2
Variance σ2 = 1
N
∑N
i=1(x(i) − µ)2
Skewness skew = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
x(i)−µ
σ
)3
Kurtosis kurt = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
x(i)−µ
σ
)4
Root Mean Square rms =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
2
Max max =max(x(i))i=1...N
Energy en = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
2
TABLE II: Ranking of the features calculated by Relief-F
algorithm [22].
Prototype Weight Real-vehicle Weight
1. Mean 0.1195 Root Mean Square 0.2401
2. Root Mean Square 0.1060 Max 0.2001
3. Max 0.0467 Mean 0.1910
4. Standard Deviation 0.0435 Energy 0.1792
5. Energy 0.0314 Kurtosis 0.0934
6. Kurtosis 0.0310 Skewness 0.0692
7. Skewness 0.0220 Standard Deviation 0.0250
8. Variance 0.0125 Variance 0.0177
The value of elapsed bits from the SOF at each rising edge
can be calculated as follows:
b telapsed + 500
2000
c (9)
where, 500 is added in the numerator to round telapsed by
1000 ns, 2000 is the value of tbit in ns. Also, 500 is offset to
obtain the correct elapsed bits. And the ideal value of elapsed
bits can be obtained with floor function.
Therefore, the ideal elapsed time from SOF, tideal (ns) can
be calculated as follows:
tideal = b telapsed + 500
2000
c × 2000 (10)
tdelay (ns) we want to calculate is:
tdelay = telapsed−tideal = telapsed−b telapsed + 500
2000
c×2000
(11)
D. Feature Extraction
In order to efficiently classify ECUs, we select the suitable
statistical features. Similar to the conventional method [7], we
select the features from several statistical characteristics (see
Table I). Also, We have used the Relief-F algorithm [22] to
select the suitable features using a weight of each feature from
the Weka 3 Toolkit [23]. The Relief-F is a filter method. It
is possible to rank and select the most significant features.
We conducted Relief-F to the delay-time from prototype and
real-vehicle. As a result, the Relief-F calculated the features
of ranking as shown in Table II. In both prototype and real-
vehicle, we confirmed that Mean, Root Mean Square, and Max
are ranked from 1st to 3rd in the ranking. This result suggests
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Fig. 5: Implementation and prototype.
that we can efficiently classify ECUs either prototype or real-
vehicle using the selected features. Hence, we use Mean, Root
Mean Square, and Max as the suitable statistical features to
efficiently classify ECUs.
E. Classification
The sender identification can result in a classification prob-
lem. We use k-nearest neighbor (k = 5) in Divider. The
algorithm is the simplest in machine learning algorithms. In
addition, it is possible that ECUs’ limited resources in the
in-vehicle system can execute k-nearest neighbor.
F. Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation of Divider.
As mentioned in Section IV-C2, the proposed method mea-
sures the 34 bits to observe delay-time no matter what length
of the data field is received. We show the block diagrams of
the implementation of Divider in Fig. 5 (a). The MCP2551 is
a chip that serves CAN transceiver as the interface between
a CAN controller and the physical bus. We also selected a
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) as a measurement
device, because a measurement with software cannot process
all messages without missing ones due to the limitation of the
ability of microcomputer. We show the prototype of IDS in
Fig. 5 (b). We developed the prototype of the proposed method
using FPGA and microcomputer. We selected the DE0-CV
Cyclone V Board (5CEBA4F23C7) as FPGA and Raspberry Pi
3 model B as microcomputer. Also, we release the source code
[24] of the proposed method written by Verilog and Python
hoping to promote the research of the sender identification
method.
Here, we describe the circuits of FPGA in the proposed
method. The circuits are divided into four operations. The
first is sampling circuit. This circuit measures a period of
CAN message in the measurement period of 34 bits with
counting. The sampling circuit sends counting value to FIFO
per Rx rising edge of CAN. The second is the arbitration ID
identification circuit. As its name suggests, we observe and
store the arbitration ID of every message. Like the sampling
circuit, the arbitration ID sampling circuit sends arbitration
ID to FIFO per Rx rising edge too. The third is FIFO. Here,
we stack the measured data of 32 bits constructed from an
arbitration ID of 11 bits and the counter value of the dominant
period of 21 bits. The last is the SPI module. We implement the
SPI slave module to send measurement data to the Raspberry
Pi.
The operation of the measurement is as follows.
1) Starting the capture of measurement time and arbitration
ID, an occurrence at the falling edge of SOF bit.
2) Send the measurement data (arbitration ID and measure-
ment time) with every rising edge of Rx to FIFO. Also,
after Raspberry Pi receives the measurement data from
the FPGA, calculate the delay-time by equation (11) and
record the delay-time.
3) After 34 bits from SOF, the measurement is ended.
4) When CAN frame is completely received, the sampling
circuit and arbitration ID identification circuit are wait-
ing SOF bit.
V. EVALUATION
A. Environments
In this section, we evaluate Divider of the proposed method
on a prototype of CAN bus, and real-vehicle.
Fig. 6 (a) shows the prototype of the CAN bus topology
we implemented in our experiment. We prepare various ECUs
to evaluate Divider. The various ECUs we prepared are de-
scribed here. ECU0 is panda OBD-II interface [25], ECU1 is
Raspberry Pi model B mounted with PiCAN 2 board, ECUs
2 and 3 are Arduino UNO mounted with CAN-BUS Shield,
ECU4 is an actual ECU not connected other than CAN, ECUs
5 and 6 are an actual combination meter of each different car
model. We cannot control sending CAN messages of ECUs 4,
5, and 6 but these ECUs automatically send some messages
periodically, so that Divider uses the messages to fingerprint
ECU.
Fig. 6 (b) shows a part of CAN in real-vehicle which is
used to evaluate Divider. The real-vehicle has multiple CAN
buses. One of these CAN buses has a realistic environment
in which each ECU has a yaw-rate sensor or an acceleration
sensor sends the information to the meter ECU. This CAN
bus also has OBD-II port. In the real-vehicle experiment, we
have collected the datasets during driving and stopping.
First, we show the ability to fingerprint various ECUs in
Divider. Next, we evaluate the accuracy of intrusion detection
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(b) A part of CAN bus in our real-vehicle.
Fig. 6: Environments.
of Divider against a compromised ECU and an unmonitored
ECU.
B. Identification of various ECU: Prototype and real-vehicle
1) Prototype of CAN bus: First of all, we evaluate the
ability to the identification of various ECU in the prototype
environment. The bus topology of the prototype is shown
in Fig. 6 (a). We have captured 1000 messages from each
ECU. The 1000 messages are used to calculate the features
of Mean, Root Mean Square, and Max. We use the features
to learn sender characteristics. Next, we divided the messages
into learning data (80 %) and testing data (20 %). Hence, we
evaluate the proposed method using K-fold cross validation
in K = 5.
As a result, an average of accuracy is 79.07 %. The one
confusion matrix in K-fold cross validation is shown in Fig.
7 (a). It can be seen that Divider can identify correctly with
up to 98.94 %. While a minimal identification rate is 25.47 %.
2) Real-vehicle: We have also evaluated ECU identification
accuracy in real vehicle’s CAN bus. We have captured 200000
messages from the ECUs. We extracted the feature data from
the 360 messages of each ECU to align the number of
messages of each ECU in the learning and verification data.
As with the prototype, we divided the data of the delay-time
of each arbitration ID into learning data (80 %) and testing
data (20 %). Hence, we evaluate the proposed method using
K-fold cross validation in K = 5.
From the K-fold cross validation, Divider performed well
with an average accuracy of 88.77 %. The confusion matrix is
shown in Fig. 7 (b). It can be seen that Divider can identify
correctly with up to 100.00 %. While a minimal identification
rate is 64.29 %.
C. Intrusion Detection
1) Compromised ECU: In this section, we evaluate the in-
trusion detection capability of the learned model. To reproduce
compromised ECU, we sent an arbitration ID: x assigned in
ECU6 from ECU1 spoofed to ECU6. Spoofing attacks were
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Fig. 7: Confusion matrix for the identification of ECUs.
TABLE III: Confusion matrix against sending ID: x from
compromised ECU (ECU1) spoofed to ECU6.
Predicted: Attack Predicted: Normal
Actual: Attack 0.967 0.033
Actual: Normal 0.168 0.832
performed for three minutes from ECU1, and the data during
attacks of ECUs 1 and 6 were classified by the learned model.
The results are shown in Table III. Predicted: Attack label is
when Divider classifies messages of ID: x as other than ECU6,
Predicted: Normal label is when Divider classifies messages
of ID: x as ECU6. We confirm the true positive rate against
compromised ECU is 96.7 % and the true negative rate is
83.2 %.
2) Unmonitored ECU: Similar to compromised ECU, we
evaluate the ability of intrusion detection against unmonitored
ECU. We attached the Arduino UNO (the ECU2 in the pro-
totype of CAN bus) as an unmonitored ECU in CAN of real-
vehicle. We assume the spoofing attacks of speed information
from the unmonitored ECU. Therefore, the unmonitored ECU
sends ID: y assigned as arbitration ID of speed in real-vehicle.
Spoofing attacks were performed for three minutes from
unmonitored ECU, and the data during sending messages of
ECU3 (legitimate ECU of ID: y) and unmonitored ECU were
TABLE IV: Confusion matrix against sending ID: y from
unmonitored ECU spoofed to ECU3.
Predicted: Attack Predicted: Normal
Actual: Attack 0.980 0.020
Actual: Normal 0.080 0.920
classified by the learned model. The results are shown in Table.
IV. We confirm the true positive rate against unmonitored ECU
is 98.0 % and the true negative rate is 92.0 %.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Fingerprinting ECUs
As Fig. 7 (b) shows, the number of ECUs with a classifi-
cation accuracy of more than 80% are 6 out of 7 in the real-
vehicle. Thus, our evaluations clearly showed the difference
in the delay-time of some ECUs.
While in the prototype, a minimal identification rate is
25.47%. This lower result was caused by the difference of
delay-time is sometimes close between different ECUs.
In such cases, the proposed method cannot classify the
ECUs correctly, because the experimental device does not
have sufficient time resolution (20 ns). Since a device of
sufficient time resolution can more sparsely divide the delay-
times, the proposed method using the device of sufficient time
resolution will classify ECUs with high accuracy more than
our experimental device. Therefore, we consider improving the
time resolution as future work.
B. Number of sampling
Next, we discuss the number of samplings performed by
sender identification methods for each CAN message. Table
V shows a comparison among the methods. The number of
samplings per CAN message for Choi’s method, Scission, and
SIMPLE depends on the length of the data field. Thus, we
consider the case when the data field is the shortest (0 byte)
and longest (8 byte). If the data field is shortest (0 byte), the
length of CAN message is 47 bit from Fig. 1. Also, when the
bit rate of CAN is 500 kbps, the transmission time for 1 bit
is 2 µs. Hence, the sampling rate of each method is multiplied
by 47×2×10−6. As a result, the best number of sampling per
CAN message is 198×103, 1980, 47 respectively. Similarly, if
the data field is longest (8 byte), the length of CAN message
is 111 bit. Therefore, the worst number of sampling per CAN
message is 444× 103, 4440, 111 respectively. The number of
samplings per message in the proposed method depends on
the number of signal transitions from 0 to 1, not the length of
the data field. Consequently, The minimum and the maximum
number of sampling of the proposed method are discussed
with Arbitration ID 0x000, which has a small number of
bit transitions, and Arbitration ID 0x555, which has a large
number of transitions. As a result, in the case of arbitration
ID 0x000, the best number of sampling reached 5. In the case
of arbitration ID 0x555, the worst number of sampling reached
14. The results show that the proposed method has the least
number of samplings at the data acquisition phase; in other
TABLE V: Comparison among sender identification methods
in Sampling Rate (S.R.), Best Number of Sampling per
message (B.N.S.), Worst Number of Sampling per message
(W.N.S.), Time Complexity (T.C.).
Choi et al. [15] Scission [7] SIMPLE [18] Divider
S.R. 2 GS/s 20 MS/s 500 kS/s -
B.N.S. 198× 103 1980 47 5
W.N.S. 444× 103 4440 111 14
T.C. Ω(n logn) Ω(n logn) Θ(n) Θ(n)
words, the proposed method has the smallest n at the feature
extraction stage. Hence, the feature extraction of Divider is
possible with light processing.
Finally, we discuss computational complexity. The method
of Choi et al. and Scission use time and frequency domain
features. Therefore, these methods need Ω(n log n) time be-
cause these methods perform Fourier Transforms to calculate
the frequency domain feature. Also, since SIMPLE calculates
the mean as a statistic with a time domain feature, it takes
Θ(n). Similarly, because Divider uses statistic features in
Table. I, Divider needs Θ(n). Therefore, we confirmed that
the computational complexities of SIMPLE and Divider are
lower than the computational complexities of other methods.
From these comparisons among related works, we con-
firmed that Divider can reduce the amount of data in the data
acquisition phase than the other voltage-based methods.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To avoid the security risk on automobiles, IDSs using
features of physical-level such as the voltage value has been
proposed. However, these IDSs require high sampling rates
and high computing resources. In this research, we proposed
a delay-time based sender identification method which is low
sampling rate. We implemented the experimental devices using
FPGA and microcomputer to verify our method for identi-
fication. As a result, we confirm that the proposed method
achieved a true positive rate of 96.7 % in CAN bus prototype
against spoofing attack from compromised ECU. We have
released our research [24] in the hope to promote research on
sender identification. In our future work, we plan to improve
the time resolution of Divider and to try various learning
algorithms such as random forest classifier. Furthermore, we
will consider the Intrusion Prevention System based on the
sender identification method.
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